Password managers less secure than promised
ethz.ch
Researchers from ETH Zurich have discovered serious security vulnerabilities in three popular, cloud-based password managers. During testing, they were able to view and even make changes to stored passwords.
  • Millions of people use password managers. They make accessing online services and bank accounts easy and simplify credit card payments.
  • Many providers promise absolute security – the data is said to be so encrypted that even the providers themselves cannot access it.
  • However, researchers from ETH Zurich have shown that it is possible for hackers to view and even change passwords.
  • felbane@lemmy.worldEnglish
    4·
    11 days ago

    tl;dr:

    1. If the password manager server is hacked and compromised, then syncing your passwords with the compromised server will lead to compromised passwords (duh)
    2. None of the providers tested have (or have had in the past) compromised servers.

    and an observation or two:

    • Vaultwarden is free, self-hostable, and doesn’t rely on trust in a third party.
    • Keepass (and its client variants, like KeepassXC which is pretty great) is even more secure because there is no server, just an encrypted file you can store anywhere.
    • orclev@lemmy.worldEnglish
      2·
      11 days ago

      Keepass (and its client variants, like KeepassXC which is pretty great) is even more secure because there is no server, just an encrypted file you can store anywhere.

      And simultaneously less secure because it’s up to you to handle keeping your vault synced between various devices and most people are significantly worse at keeping systems secure than the professionals at the password managers.

      Self hosting a server of some kind or using something like Keepass on a single device (with offline backups) is the most secure option, but as usual with security doing so trades significant convenience for security. For most people who are uninterested in making sure their servers are kept up to date week to week letting professionals handle it is the better option.

      • FauxLiving@lemmy.worldEnglish
        2·
        10 days ago

        And simultaneously less secure because it’s up to you to handle keeping your vault synced between various devices and most people are significantly worse at keeping systems secure than the professionals at the password managers.

        It is not less secure.

        If the Bitwarden servers are compromised (either by hacking or by being forced to by the government of the country where they are hosted) then code could be run which would allow the attacker to receive your plaintext password and that is used to decrypt your data.

        If a user is so horrible at syncing that they accidentally synced their database file to a public Twitter post, it is still protected by AES-256 which can’t be broken by a simple subpoena.

        In either case, syncthing is pretty simple to use and is the common recommendation for the kind of small personal file sync that you need here. It also adds an additional security layer, on top of the unbreakable AES-256 encryption, to the whole setup.

      • shortwavesurfer@lemmy.zipEnglish
        0·
        10 days ago

        I store my keypass database on several flash drives in different physical locations and update them several times per year to make sure that even if I do lose the copy I have, the versions on the flash drives, not at my physical location, are decently up to date, and so if I do lose any of the password data, it will be only for a couple of months worth if that.

        If I add things that are extremely important, such as a new mortgage provider, or some sort of financial data into my keypass database, then I do an unscheduled immediate update to all of my flash drives in different physical locations to make sure that they all have that, but if it’s just a social media account, and I was to lose access to it, and not have the password for it, then… I wouldn’t be too upset about it.

        In the absolute worst possible case, I stand to lose 3 months worth of data. It’s not often that I have to tweak stuff in my password manager, so that would be very few changes.

        • Appoxo@lemmy.dbzer0.comEnglish
          0·
          9 days ago

          Great.
          I am now your spouse and you want to give me access to the flash drive. What now?

          New requirement: I have several passwords I want to give you access to as well. What now?

          As with everything: Your solution may work for yourself and a few others. The majority don’t want to collect 5 flash drives in different locations every 3 months to update a file (and making sure it’s the correct vault they have copied)

          • shortwavesurfer@lemmy.zipEnglish
            0·
            9 days ago

            PThe master copy stays on my device. If I need to give somebody access to a specific password, I just give them that password locally and they put it in their password manager for that account.

            Same thing occurs if they need to give me a password. They give me the password. I put it in my password manager and then I’m the one who updates the flash drives on the rotating basis like I mentioned above.

            • Appoxo@lemmy.dbzer0.comEnglish
              0·
              9 days ago

              Great.
              Now your data is (potentially) exactly where you are trying to keep it out of.

              So you made it more cumbersome to yourself by keeping your data as local as possible, yet still chosing to give up the tiny sliver of additional security for the comfort of others.

              I don’t want to be annoying. But I hope you see what I am trying to convey.

              • shortwavesurfer@lemmy.zipEnglish
                2·
                9 days ago

                I’m sorry, but I really don’t see what you’re trying to convey. The people I give my passwords to also don’t use cloud password managers.

    • patatahooligan@lemmy.worldEnglish
      0·
      10 days ago

      If the password manager server is hacked and compromised, then syncing your passwords with the compromised server will lead to compromised passwords (duh)

      What do you mean “duh”? The password managers claim that the exact opposite is true.

      Most service providers therefore promote their products with the promise of “zero-knowledge encryption”. This means they assure users that their stored passwords are encrypted and even the providers themselves have “zero knowledge” of them and no access to what has been stored. “The promise is that even if someone is able to access the server, this does not pose a security risk to customers because the data is encrypted and therefore unreadable. We have now shown that this is not the case”, explains Matilda Backendal.

      This would be true for a properly implemented end-to-end encryption scheme.

      • felbane@lemmy.worldEnglish
        01·
        9 days ago

        “Properly implemented” is doing the heavy lifting in that sentence.

        Four paragraphs down from your quote is this:

        Their attacks ranged from integrity violations affecting specific, targeted user vaults to the complete compromise of all vaults within an organisation using the service. In most cases, the researchers were able to gain access to the passwords – and even make changes to them.

        If E2EE were properly implemented, the above would be impossible.